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 1 Introduction1
Lifelong learning is a high priority issue in the EU in particular. Lifelong learn-
ing is mainly seen as promoting the employability of a country’s citizens. Given
the aging populations of most European countries, preserving the human capi-
tal of the labor force is more important now than ever. In recognition of this,
the EU Lisbon Protocol includes adult education targets. The aim by 2010 is
to have 12.5% of adults participating in further education in any given month.
Educational policies in many countries are based on a belief that these aims
cannot be achieved by market forces alone, and require targeted government
intervention in the adult education market. These interventions may comprise
both monetary and non-monetary measures. Government subsidization of adult
education may be of two basic kinds, demand-oriented or supply-oriented. To
enhance allocative and productive eﬃciency, direct funding of subjects seek-
ing adult education (demand-oriented) is becoming more common than funding
the education providers (supply-oriented). Demand-oriented adult education
funding is possible through the use of various tools, including adult education
vouchers (see Oosterbeek 1998 or Oosterbeek and Patrinos 2009).
The experiment described in this paper is also motivated by the fact that adult
education vouchers are in actual use in some countries and are not a hypothet-
ical funding tool. In all known adult education voucher models, launch was
not preceded by a real-life trial period that would have been useful in testing
the workability of the tool and establishing that the necessary framework was
in place to enable the model to succeed. Ex-post evaluations also tend to fail
because it is impossible to reconstruct many key parameters in retrospect, and
because universal launch means there is no control group available that could be
used for reference purposes. Against this background, the experiment presented
1The authors wish to thank the Federal Oﬃce for Professional Education and Technology
for ﬁnancial and the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce for logistic support in the conduct of the
experiment. The authors are also grateful for the opportunity to utilize Swiss Labor Force
Survey (SLFS) data. The second author also wishes to thank CESifo for their hospitality and
stimulating working conditions while preparing this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely
the authors’ responsibility.
1here does two things: it provides data of relevance to the prospective potential
launch of an adult education voucher system, and also provides information of
interest in evaluating the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of existing models.
The ﬁeld experiment was conducted in Switzerland in the 2006-2007 period.
Switzerland’s adult education participation rates are in the upper range of the
EU average. At present, adult education policies and the adult education mar-
ket in Switzerland (cf. OECD 2003) are highly free-market based in comparison
with other industrialized countries. The relatively low level of government inter-
vention is being called into question in Switzerland (as in other countries), one
reason being the signiﬁcant variation in adult educational rates between diﬀer-
ent sectors of the population. A vigorous educational policy debate is currently
raging in Switzerland as to whether this problem can be addressed with adult
education vouchers. Debate is additionally fuelled by the fact that one canton
(Geneva) has had a real-life, universal voucher model for adult education for a
number of years now and the fact that a constitutional obligation to regulate
adult education for the whole of Switzerland through a Federal Adult Education
Act exists since 2006. The latter was also the starting point for investigating the
workability of an adult education voucher system in the form of a scientiﬁcally
designed ﬁeld experiment in Switzerland.
This paper is structured as follows: the next section states brieﬂy why the
government should intervene in adult education funding at all. Reference will
be made to a few cases of actual implementation of demand-oriented adult
education tools, but all of these are insuﬃciently evaluated. Section 3 provides
a detailed description of the experiment performed. Section 4 gives descriptive
results, and section 5 compares and contrasts the experimental and control group
in terms of econometric analyses. The paper concludes with the preliminary
conclusions to be drawn from the experiment conducted.
22 Public funding of life-long learning
Although public funding of life-long learning is politically undisputed in virtu-
ally all European countries, evidence and economics-based arguments for this
kind of intervention is thin on the ground. Government intervention in the adult
education market can be justiﬁed if a general or partial excessively low partici-
pation in adult education is a consequence of positive externalities of education.
Suboptimal participation in adult education in such a case would be because
part of the return on adult education does not directly accrue to those engaging
in adult education/training, and this in turn would justify public subsidizing of
the cost of adult education. Pursuing a similar line of argument, one can as-
sume that non-education generates social costs, i.e. negative externalities, which
the State can reduce by providing subsidies to encourage educationally inactive
individuals to opt for adult education.
Whatever the average level of participation in adult education, participation
levels are unequally distributed in almost all countries. Individuals with low
educational attainment and the elderly are signiﬁcantly less likely to pursue
adult education (see Bassanini et al. 2005). These distributional aspects can
also justify State funding, if education is not within the ﬁnancial grasp of all
citizens and there is no credit market to serve funding needs. The lack of a func-
tioning credit market for funding adult education is no surprise, as investment
in adult education is associated with high default and return risks, which might
militate against the establishment of a functioning private credit market2. It
is important to bear in mind that, if education generates private earnings only,
equable distribution can be achieved if the State provides loans to replace the
missing credit market. In this scenario, the government merely provides an
advance on the cost of education rather than subsidizing it. In other words,
the loans would not be provided to adult education participants interest-free.
Government-subsidized education is hence justiﬁed only if the market outcome
were causing suboptimal demand for education.
2Whether credit limitations are indeed the reason for poor adult education participation
is not undisputed (see Brunello and De Paola 2009).
3Diﬀerences in adult education participation rates may also be due to diﬀerences
in return on adult education. If returns on adult education are actually very low
for certain population groups, diﬀerences in adult education rates might in fact
be economically eﬃcient (see Vignoles et al. 2004) despite running contrary to
the notion of equitability of distribution3. To qualify matters, it is important
to note that the - in some cases - low private monetary gains from training are
more usually a consequence of labor market friction rather than indicating that
training/education is ineﬀective (see e.g. Conti 2005). Although labor market
frictions of the kind lead to a higher participation of employers in covering the
cost of adult education (see Brunello and Bassanini 2008), the drawback is that
employees who are not funded by their employers have no appreciable monetary
incentives to invest in adult education themselves. This is another reason for
the State to subsidize adult education, so as to give individuals with no em-
ployer support the opportunity to engage in adult education. This also includes
non-employed individuals whose chances of entering the workforce stand to gain
from adult education.
The non-monetary costs of education are just as plausible a reason for diﬀer-
ences in adult education participation rates as are a lack of monetary gains or
credit limitations. It seems logical that these non-monetary costs will be higher
for individuals with lower educational attainment than those with higher educa-
tional attainment, and it is logical that this would be one reason for the major
diﬀerences in adult education participation rates4. If that is indeed the case, a
more evenly distributed adult education participation rate might be achievable
through increased ﬁnancial incentives, but it would be worth exploring whether
3Of interest here are sources in the literature suggesting that returns on adult education
are appreciable only if a certain critical level of formal educational attainment is already in
place (see Brunello 2001). This would indicate that high participation in adult education
is best promoted by a good basic education, i.e., government investment in early education
would be more eﬀective and more eﬃcient in every respect (see Cunha et al. 2005 or Silles
2007).
4This mainly refers to cognitive costs, which make education more of an eﬀort for some
people than others and deter the latter from pursuing adult education (see Heckman et al.
2005).
4other measures might not be more eﬀective and eﬃcient.
It is striking that, in Europe at least (but not only; see OECD 2004a&b), most
countries are intervening heavily in the adult education market regardless of
whether this kind of intervention is justiﬁed on the basis of scientiﬁc evidence.
Intervention may be in the form of subsidizing the providers of adult education,
tax exemptions for spending on education by individuals and employers, and in
the form of actively pushing demand.
An overview of adult education support measures in the EU-15 countries (EIM
2005) shows that more than 90 diﬀerent tools are in use today. Although voucher
models are in the minority, they are in actual current use in a number of Euro-
pean countries. In most cases, these funding tools are subject to restrictions in
terms of time, region or entitled individuals. This makes it diﬃcult to generalize
between the models. Current education voucher models are provided by the re-
gional chambers of trade in Austria (see Lachmayr 2004), the Training Cheque
in the canton of Geneva (Switzerland) (see Wolter et al. 2003), the Training
Cheque in Belgium (see Bollens 2005), adult education vouchers in some Italian
regions (set up by the national Ministry of Labor with European Social Fund
monies) and the North Rhine-Westphalian Training Check (since 2006)5. One
thing all these real-life voucher models have in common is that they involve
heavy ﬁnancial investment but there is no real scientiﬁcally justiﬁable evalua-
tion of their impact. Therefore, these models will not be presented in greater
detail in this paper6.
5In a limited experiment in South Tyrol (1996/7), 1,500 individuals were sent three vouch-
ers each worth 25 euros (see Tappeiner and Trompedeller 2002). The design of this exercise
is not comparable to ours due to the absence of a proper control group. Approximately 7%
of the issued vouchers were redeemed.
6This paper does not look in detail at voucher trials in other areas of education (e.g.
in the compulsory school system where voucher trials have been combined with randomized
trials on several occasions; see Ladd 2002, Krueger and Zhu 2004), or voucher trials directed
at companies rather than individuals, or those intended for other services rather than adult
education/training, an example being the voucher trial for job mediation services in Germany
(see Winterhager et al. 2006). The experiment described is also not suited to analyze changes
in the supply of education, as was possible with other vouchers experiments (e.g. for the
53 The experiment
3.1 Experiments as an evaluation tool
Experiments are an increasingly common economic research tool. Their ad-
vantage over other investigating methods is the greater ease in measuring and
establishing causal eﬀects. The experimental design makes it easier to control
for imponderables and hence eliminate any results bias (see Rubin 1974). Al-
though econometric evaluation methods have made great strides in the past two
decades, some issues are so complex that statistical methods produce robust
outcomes only if stringent assumptions are applied. Experiments are therefore
especially likely to produce more meaningful outcomes in situations where so-
cial interactions or complex institutional structures play an important role (see
Manski, 2005)7. Experiments can be conducted either in a controlled artiﬁcial
laboratory situation or in real life. In the latter case, observers can choose
between natural and social experiments. In natural experiments, researchers
beneﬁt from the fortuitous circumstance that emergent changes have created
a situation that sets the scene for an experiment, despite the lack of a formal
experimental design8. However, naturally occurring developments of this kind
cannot be relied upon to take place when they are needed, so it is necessary in
the case of some studies to create artiﬁcial situations in which parameters of a
real-life observable state are manipulated deliberately by the scientist in order
to investigate a speciﬁc issue.
Although lab experiments enable more stringent control of exogenous variables,
pre-school daycare supply, see Viitanen 2007).
7Although randomized trials are the gold standard of research in the USA in particular,
experimental research has been slow to become established in education research (see Cook
2003, Oakley 2003 and Angrist 2004), as reﬂected in the very small number of experimental
ﬁeld studies. Nevertheless, the fact that questions of causality - in the area of education as in
other ﬁelds - are best answered by experimental research is undisputed (see Webbink 2005).
8A prime example of a natural experiment of the kind are extensions of compulsory school-
ing times, which allow the impact of education on labor market outcomes to be analyzed as in
an experiment (see e.g. Pischke 2004) or the change in the loans and grant system for college
studies (see Rothstein and Rouse 2007).
6not all scientiﬁc objectives are amenable to investigation in a lab experiment9.
In this case, where the objective was to evaluate the impact of vouchers on par-
ticipation in adult education, it was necessary to design a ﬁeld experiment which
was to take place in the subjects’ natural environment. Active experimental in-
terventions of this kind to analyze particular connections are a longstanding
tradition in economic research, especially in the ﬁeld of government-funded so-
cial and labor market programs (see e.g. LaLonde 1986). At the same time, their
use is limited both because of the ﬁnancial resources required for experimental
simulation of measures in the ﬁeld, and moral/ethical concerns surrounding this
kind of evaluation. If it is clear ex ante that individuals participating in the ex-
periment are likely to derive advantages or disadvantages from the experiment,
it may be diﬃcult to justify and conduct such experimentation.
Compared with evaluations of ongoing programs, experimental evaluation of
measures that have not yet been implemented is compounded by the fact that
the experimental situation may seem so artiﬁcial to the treatment group as to
falsify their behavior. Therefore, two factors are crucial to the success of a ﬁeld
experiment. Firstly, the experimental setting must seem so natural to the sub-
jects that their actions in the experimental situation correspond to how they
would react if the situation were not experimental but real10. If an experiment
is very diﬀerent from real life, it is doubtful whether the same eﬀects would be
observed in the corresponding real-life situation. Secondly, there are abundant
examples showing that both the individuals in the experimental group and in-
dividuals in the control group may act other than in real life simply become of
their awareness of being participants in an experiment. Ideally, an experiment
must be designed such that all participants are unaware that their behavior is
9Examples of randomized ﬁeld experiments are more and more frequent in cases where the
key environmental variables are seen only in the ﬁeld and cannot be reproduced in the lab.
Some studies also investigate items in ﬁeld experiments which were previously studied only
in a lab setting (for a selection of current experiments, see Bettinger and Slonim 2006, Meier
2006, Falk 2007, Fehr and Goette 2007, Gneezy and List 2007 or Kling, Liebman and Katz
2007).
10‘...representativeness of the environment, rather than representative of the sampled pop-
ulation, is the most crucial variable...’ (List 2006)
7being investigated. This ideal setting corresponds to a so-called natural ﬁeld
experiment (see Levitt and List 2008, pp 26-27).
In recognition of these diﬃculties, considerable planning and thought went into
designing the experiment described here to ensure that 1) the experimental sit-
uation approximated a real-life situation as closely as possible so as to enable
the results to be generalizable to real life, 2) the experimental group subjects
were not aware that their actions were under observation, as they would other-
wise have changed their behavior for strategic reasons; 3) control group subjects
remained entirely oblivious to the experimental situation, i.e., they behaved ex-
actly as they would have done without the experiment, and 4) the observers did
not intervene during the actual performance of the experiment and hence were
unable to inﬂuence the outcomes.
3.2 Experimental design and propositions
The key study objectives were to establish the following:
a) Does the issuance of adult education vouchers cause an increase in uptake
of continuous education measures, and if so, among whom?
b) Is it possible to calculate the deadweight loss, i.e., the proportion of the
voucher value that is redeemed but only for adult training that the bene-
ﬁciaries would have paid for themselves in any case had they not received
adult education vouchers?
c) Is there any price sensitivity to the face value of the voucher, i.e., does
utilization of the voucher depend on its value?
d) Does it matter whether vouchers are issued on their own or whether they
come with an oﬀer of advice and support?
Questions a) and b) are answerable only if the experimental group (individuals
receiving vouchers) can be compared with a control group diﬀering from the
experimental group solely and exclusively in terms of their not having received
a voucher. Allocation to the experimental group/control group must there-
fore be based on random assignment. Questions c) and d) can be answered
8only if not all individuals in the experimental group received the same vouchers.
Again, allocation within the experimental group must be on a randomized basis.
The experiment beneﬁted from the fact that the SLFS sample population was
raised signiﬁcantly at the beginning of the century prior to being reduced more
recently because of ﬁnancial constraints. The SLFS is structured according to
a rotating panel principle in which the respondents are interviewed ﬁve years
in succession. As a result, about one-ﬁfth of the respondent population is re-
placed every year. The additional reduction in the sample population yielded
the opportunity to select a random sample for the experiment from the approx-
imately 6,000 individuals who would otherwise have been scheduled to continue
participating in the next round of interviews. All these individuals had already
been interviewed in 2005, and most of them had also been interviewed in former
years, and had been removed from the interview schedule in 2006 because of
the sample size reduction. Based on a potential voucher redemption rate and
the associated costs, group sizes were determined for the experiment that were
intended to produce a suﬃcient number of observations to satisfy statistical de-
mands. The random sample comprised a total of 2,437 individuals who were
further divided up according to the criteria of face value of the voucher and
provision of advice and guidance (see Table 1).
Table 1: Division of the experimental group (number of observations)
Face value
Advice 200 CHF
11 750 CHF 1500 CHF Total
Yes 408 407 404 1,219
No 407 407 404 1,218
Total 815 814 808 2,437
The experimental group is matched by a control group of about 14,000 indi-
viduals who were interviewed by the SLFS as scheduled in 2006 and met the
criterion of having been interviewed in 2005. The experimental design enables
111 CHF is equivalent to about 1 USD or 0.62 EUR.
9the use of longitudinal data as well as cross-sectional information, which is im-
portant with respect to the issue of interest here. For example, it is well known
that prior adult education participation is the best predictor for participation in
adult education at a given point in time. Although this information could also
be obtained on the basis of retrospective surveys, the opportunity to observe the
control and experimental group pre-experiment provides a much more reliable
method.
With respect to the control and experimental group, age was the only limitation.
Only subjects aged 20 to 60 were entitled to receive vouchers. Under-20s would
be likely to be still undergoing education or training, and over-60s would be
likely to be retired pensioners. There were no limitations as to employment
status, as increasing the skills of non-employed individuals may be a goal of the
State.
3.3 Experimental conduct and schedule
The 2,400 randomly selected individuals received a letter from the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oﬃce during the ﬁrst days of January 200612 containing the adult
education voucher. The letter stated that the voucher was in reward for past
participation in the Swiss Labor Force Survey. It was signed by the General
Director of the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce to eliminate any doubts as to the
legitimacy of the voucher. No public-domain information was generated at any
point during the experimental period, to ensure that voucher recipients were
unaware that the dispensing of the voucher was part of an observational study.
For half of the vouchers, the letter contained a telephone hotline number oﬀering
free advice. This service was provided by a professional organization specializing
in adult education consulting. The consultations were recorded and evaluated13.
12A longer voucher redemption time would have been desirable but legal and political veri-
ﬁcation processes delayed voucher issuance.
13Data protection mechanisms unfortunately prevent us from linking speciﬁc information
from the advice sessions with SLFS data. We can only use information on the type of voucher,
i.e. we know who was oﬀered the advice option, but not whether they actually availed of the
oﬀer.
10Recipients were entitled to use the voucher for an adult education module of
their choice. There were no restrictions on the content of the adult education
module because the intention was to use the choices as a basis for an eﬃciently
designed adult education voucher system later on.
Recipients were allowed to use the voucher to pay for an ongoing adult educa-
tion module. The ﬁnal date for starting an adult education program was July
2006. This was done in a bid to maximize the redemption timescale. Though
problems might have occurred at the beginning and end of the redemption pe-
riod, the temporal pattern of redemptions showed a signiﬁcantly lower number
of redemptions in the ﬁrst and last month of the experiment and a fairly stable
redemption pattern in the February to June period, peaking in mid-experiment
(April). The time pattern for voucher redemptions does not suggest any unin-
tentional special eﬀects. To redeem the voucher, it was necessary to send the
voucher with the course organizer’s invoice to the Federal Oﬃce for Professional
Education and Technology, which in turn paid out the amount to participants.
The federal agency conducted spot checks to verify that the adult education
uptake and invoices were bona-ﬁde. Toward the end of June, the experimental
subjects were surveyed for the Swiss Labor Force Survey as in previous years.
To enable later linkage of the latter survey data with the experimental data,
the participants were required at the end of the survey to say whether they con-
sented to data linkage. This ensured both that the replies to the Swiss Labor
Force Survey’s standard questions were not skewed because of linkage with the
adult education voucher, and also ensured that data protection concerns were
addressed.
4 Descriptive results and voucher utilization
Out of the 2,437 individuals receiving adult education vouchers, 1,888 (77.5%)
took part in the SLFS at the end of June 200614. Fortunately, hardly any of
14The long-standing mean SLFS participation rate is 83%-89%. Analysis of participation
rates for 2006 however showed a signiﬁcantly lower participation rate and no signiﬁcant dif-
11the respondents objected to linkage of the SLFS data with the experiment. For
data protection reasons, we were not allowed to analyze the data of individuals
in the experimental group who did not take part in the 2006 survey but for
whom we had data at least from the 2005 Swiss Labor Force Survey. However,
for the total sample of voucher recipients (2,437), we had a reduced dataset
of background variables (prior education/training, gender, region of residence
and two age categories). If we compare the estimates from the SLFS data with
the reduced dataset for all voucher recipients, we ﬁnd no qualitative diﬀerences
between the two sets of calculations. This suggests that the non-participation
in the 2006 SLFS of slightly more than 20% of the voucher recipients does not
aﬀect the results. Refusal was the reason for non-participation in very few of the
subjects; the main reason for non-participation was that many subjects could
no longer be contacted (loss to follow-up).
The evaluation concerns adult education participation in courses that cost money.
Like other adult education statistics approaches, the SLFS diﬀerentiates be-
tween diﬀerent forms of formal and informal adult education, and the participa-
tion rates naturally vary accordingly. The crucial aspect in government-funded
adult education is that it is intended to increase opportunity for attending fee-
based adult education oﬀerings. Therefore, the statistical module selected from
the adult education modules in the SLFS available was the one in respect of
which SLFS participants are subsequently asked whether they had attended
fee-based courses within the past 12 months15.
Adult education participation is investigated in terms of the eﬀect of gender,
ference between the experimental and the control group. An additional non-response analysis
disclosed no particularly conspicuous non-response pattern.
15This shows the drawback of the reduced voucher redemption period, which arose because
of legal problems. When SLFS participants are asked whether they attended fee-based adult
education courses within the past 12 months, it is always possible that experimental group
contains individuals who attended courses in the second half of 2005 before receiving the
education vouchers. Although this possibility limits the precision of the conclusion as to the
quantitative impact of the voucher on adult education participation, we believe this cosmetic
ﬂaw in the experimental design does not compromise the conclusions from this experiment.
12prior educational attainment, age, nationality and region of residence. The
latter is operationalized such that urban districts are contrasted with rural dis-
tricts. The underlying hypothesis is that demand for adult education also de-
pends in the short term from the range of adult education opportunities on
oﬀer16. It is logical to assume that adult education opportunities are more nu-
merous and far-ranging in urban than in rural regions. For subjects in paid
employment, there are additional control variables such as type of employment
(employee vs. self-employed), hours of employment (part-time), salary, size of
company, and position in the company hierarchy.
449 of the total 2,437 voucher recipients redeemed their vouchers, representing
a redemption rate of 18.4%. Redemption rates diﬀered depending on the face
value of the voucher (see Table 2). Both the CHF 750 and CHF 1,500 vouchers
were redeemed signiﬁcantly more frequently than the CHF 200 voucher, but
the rates of redemption for the higher amounts did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
each other. The conclusion is that the redemption rate seems to demonstrate
a price elasticity response to the face value of the voucher, but the relationship
is non-linear. Gender and prior educational attainment of the voucher recipient
also have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of redeeming a voucher. These
results are congruent with those of other adult education participation studies.
In contrast, the redemption rate did not depend on whether the voucher was
coupled with an advice option; nor was recipient age17 a signiﬁcant factor.
The non-eﬀect of the advice option in terms of voucher redemption rate might be
called into question if the advice oﬀering had been poorly designed. A number
of points are of interest here. Subjects were not actively advised (i.e., advice
was not provided unprompted), but were required to take the initiative and seek
advice. However, given the low barriers to receiving advice, and the extent and
price (free of charge) of the advice option, the advice option in the experiment
16More speciﬁc analyses for individual cities were performed also. These only showed that
adult education participation among employed voucher recipients was higher in the city of
Zurich than in rural areas.
17The variable of age was tested both in the linear and in a non-linear speciﬁcation.
13is likely to have been better designed than would have been the case in real life.
Therefore, the observation that an advice option - even if availed of - has no
perceptible eﬀect in terms of increasing adult education participation rates, is
an outcome that would have to be taken into account when launching voucher
systems in real life. The outcome also calls into question the eﬀectiveness of
existing government support of adult education, even if it was not possible
to test whether users of the support option embarked upon better, i.e. more
suitable, adult education options than subjects who did not avail of the support
service.
5 Econometric analysis of the impact of vouchers
on training activities
5.1 Adult education participation in the experimental and
control group
Comparison of adult education participation in the experimental vs. control
group (see Table 3) immediately shows that adult education participation in the
experimental group (approximately 40%) was more than 20 percentage points
higher than the voucher redemption rate. In other words, more than 50% of
the experimental group participated in adult education without utilizing the
voucher. As already mentioned, one reason might be that the voucher arrived
after the subjects had done the course. Another possible reason is that subjects
participated in courses that they were not called upon to pay themselves, and
hence would not have been able to use the voucher for payment. In accordance
with this hypothesis we ﬁnd that approximately half (55%) of individuals who
took part in fee-based courses and did not utilize vouchers for payment belong
to this latter category (participation with a contribution of employers, see also
5.5). Thus, the population of subjects who funded their own course despite
theoretically having had the option of using a voucher for that purpose is about
half of those who were active in training and not using the voucher.
Comparison between the experimental and control group reveals that age is not
14a signiﬁcant factor in the voucher recipient population. In the subpopulation
of employed voucher recipients, company size is not signiﬁcant. Therefore the
vouchers seem to have promoted equitability in adult education participation in
terms of some criteria at least, compared to participation rates without vouchers.
However, the vouchers emphasized some factors, such as the proportion of female
participation. The latter eﬀect is also observed in real-life models. It is also
evident in both groups that course attendance during the previous year (course
2005 variable) is signiﬁcantly associated with adult education participation the
following year.
5.2 Vouchers increased participation
Comparing the experimental and control group to test whether voucher receipt
had a signiﬁcant impact on adult education participation shows that the vouch-
ers brought about an almost six percentage point increase in participation rates
(see Table 4). This almost exactly corresponds to the simple comparison of
means between the participation rates in the two groups, indicating that the
randomly selected sample achieved its intended purpose for the experiment. A
breakdown of vouchers by face value shows that the vouchers with the high-
est face values signiﬁcantly raised levels of participation in adult education (by
practically the same level for the two amounts), but that the voucher with the
lowest face value produced no signiﬁcant increase in adult education participa-
tion levels. Looking at the employed population only, the total eﬀect of the
voucher is somewhat smaller but the voucher with the highest face value has
approximately double the impact than intermediate-value vouchers (see Table
5). For the employed population at least, there is a virtually linear impact
of voucher face value on adult education participation, with the lowest-value
voucher again producing virtually no eﬀect. Though this latter outcome was
in line with our expectations, its importance should not be underestimated. A
number of voucher models use amounts that are so small as to be unlikely to
increase participation rates, going by the observations presented here. These
vouchers are redeemed nevertheless (in the present case, 12.6% of vouchers with
the lowest face value), i.e. redemption of all these vouchers must be termed a
deadweight loss. This outcome is relevant also because the response to a high
15level of voucher redemption in a number of real-life voucher models was to de-
crease the face values continually in order to contain the volume of expenditure.
If the results presented here are taken seriously, adjustments of this kind may
stabilize the volume of expenditure of public funds but will negate any beneﬁt
of the measure in terms of added utility.
The comparisons interpreted thus far included year-earlier course attendance
as a control variable. The question as to whether the voucher increased the
educational participation of subjects with no history of adult education par-
ticipation can be veriﬁed directly. We used multinomial logistic regression to
test the impact of vouchers on adult education activity, using a reference group
consisting of subjects who did not engage in adult education in either of the
years studied (see Table 6). The data shows that intermediate- and high-value
vouchers produced a signiﬁcant increase in adult education participation in the
subpopulation of subjects who took part in adult education in 2006 and not
in 2005, which is a deﬁnite endorsement of the voucher system in terms of the
stated aims.
5.3 Determining the deadweight loss
The deadweight loss of the voucher experiment can be calculated but not ob-
served directly, i.e. we cannot distinguish between windfall gains and bona ﬁde
additional uptake of adult education in the subjects who redeemed vouchers.
However, by means of comparison with the control group, we can generate
expected values for adult education participation among the various subject
categories and hence calculate the deadweight loss for those subsets. In relation
to the total experimental population, this means that, without the experiment,
we would have had to assume an adult education participation of approximately
34% in that population. With the vouchers, the level is about 6% points higher.
However, it is necessary to take into account that approximately 18% of subjects
in the experimental group redeemed a voucher. In other words, the conclusion
is that about 60% of redeemed vouchers were used for adult education/training
that the subjects would have ﬁnanced themselves in any case without the vouch-
ers, as in the control group (see Table 7). Of interest is a comparison of windfall
16gains broken down by prior educational attainment levels. It is highly evident
that the deadweight loss increases signiﬁcantly in association with rising prior
educational attainment level. Thus it can be seen that, although subjects with
an educational attainment level equal to compulsory schooling demonstrated a
below-average voucher redemption rate (9.5%), subjects in this category used
the vouchers for a bona ﬁde increase in adult education participation in almost
two-thirds of cases. The voucher redemption rate was almost twice as high for
university graduates (21.1%), but voucher use in this subset can be described
as a deadweight loss in 91.4% of cases. In other words, in absolute terms, this
subset ultimately used fewer vouchers for a genuine rise in adult education par-
ticipation than the subset of individuals with the lowest educational attainment
levels.
5.4 Multiple courses
The voucher eﬀect has been investigated to date only on the basis of a 0/1
speciﬁcation, i.e. yes or no, adult education or no adult education. The fact
is that some individuals who engage in adult education attended more than
one fee-based course. However, multiple participation is not as widespread as
might be expected. The control group shows that, normally, approximately
three-quarters (73.6%) of individuals attend only one fee-based course within
a one-year period. Of the remaining 25%, 73% attended two courses and only
7.1% of individuals who participated in adult education within a one-year pe-
riod attended three or more courses. Comparing the control group with the
experimental group, and subdividing the experimental group into the subset
who redeemed the voucher and the subset who did not, shows that the number
of individuals attending more than one course within a one-year period rose
approximately 9% points among the voucher users (see Table 8). Multinomial
regressions on the number of courses attended show (see Table 9) that only
subjects with highest-value vouchers were signiﬁcantly more likely to attend
multiple courses. Hence, vouchers not only encourage individuals to participate
in education who would not otherwise do so, but also encourage individuals
with a history of adult education to increase their adult education uptake still
further.
175.5 Employer participation in paying for adult education
All SLFS adult education participation surveys conducted to date show that ap-
proximately half (53.4%) of fee-based adult education is funded partly or totally
by the employer. Among employed individuals - generally the sole beneﬁciaries
of employer funding -, this was the case for 58.5% of courses in 2006. Em-
ployer funding is of twofold interest in this experiment. These items of interest
are, ﬁrstly, the impact of voucher issuance on employer funding, and secondly,
the extent to which employer funding explains attendance of courses for which
voucher recipients did not redeem their voucher.
The ﬁrst question is easily answered by applying regression to the probability
of receiving employer funding for a course (see Table 10). The voucher has no
signiﬁcant impact on that probability. Accordingly, the employer-funded adult
education rates are virtually identical in the control and experimental group.
This result means that voucher issuance had no eﬀect on employer behavior,
which also means that employers had no involvement in the course attendances
prompted by voucher receipt. On the other hand, this result must also be seen
against the backdrop of the experimental design. A crowding out of employer
funding by public funding would be likely only if vouchers were introduced on
a long-term basis.
55.5% of those who received a voucher and attended a fee-based course but
did not redeem the voucher to pay for the course were recipients of employer
funding, i.e. were not at all dependent on the voucher. This leaves 45.5% of
individuals who engaged in adult education activity without using the voucher.
These subjects had either already started a course before receiving the voucher
or did not wish to redeem the voucher. This subset would be a potential source
of an additional deadweight loss in the event of permanent introduction of a
voucher system.
6 Conclusions
Irrespective of whether government intervention in the adult education mar-
ket is economically justiﬁed, interventions of this kind are common practice in
many countries today. The popularity of government measures to promote and
18support adult education contrasts starkly with the sparse evidential basis for
the eﬃcacy of such measures. In cases where ex post evaluations are available,
these are generally based on qualitative surveys of participants and as such are
of little use in evaluating impact. The randomized ﬁeld experiment with adult
education vouchers presented here therefore closes a major knowledge gap in
terms of the impact of ﬁnancial incentives on participation in adult education.
Thus, before the experiment presented here, it was unclear whether ﬁnancial
incentives would cause increased participation in adult education, because the
redemption of vouchers in real-life models could be entirely attributed to wind-
fall gains. Moreover, it was unclear whether and to what extent money matters
at all in prompting individuals with low educational attainment to participate
in adult education.
Much thought was invested in producing a realistically designed study to ensure
that experimental outcomes were not biased by artifactual behaviors introduced
by study settings. The authors endeavored in all respects to approximate as
closely as possible the launch of a real-life voucher model. In addition, the real-
istic setting ensured that the subjects were unaware that they were taking part
in an experiment. The control group was observed in their natural environment
and unaﬀected by the experiment.
Of the experimental outcomes, the following three are particularly striking:
Firstly, the vouchers raised adult education participation in the experimental
group by approximately 20%. As already mentioned, this causal eﬀect could
not be expected a priori, and therefore shows that adult education and training
activities can in fact be stimulated by oﬀering money. It is also worth noting in
this connection that the very realistically designed advice option had no signif-
icant impact on voucher redemption. Hence, it was the ﬁnancial support and
not the advice option that increased the uptake of adult education, and the
ﬁnancial support produced its eﬀect with or without the advice option. This
is a surprising outcome given the importance accorded in the literature to the
provision of information in connection with adult education participation. The
19result suggests that the eﬃcacy of existing support measures might need to be
investigated and evaluated more rigorously.
Secondly, voucher demand was price-sensitive, i.e., the face value of the voucher
is a determining factor. It is useful to note here that, though small face values
did not raise the level of participation in adult education, they were neverthe-
less redeemed, albeit to a small extent. Hence, low-value vouchers generated a
deadweight loss only. The educational policy relevance of the realization that
an eﬀective voucher system calls for fairly high minimum voucher values should
not be underestimated. At the upper end of the value scale, it was seen that,
although very high values prompted individuals to take multiple courses, an
intermediate voucher value is enough to generate a causal eﬀect in terms of
increased participation. These results show that excessively low voucher values
are neither eﬀective nor eﬃcient, and excessively high values are eﬀective but
probably not eﬃcient. Thus, it is worth investing careful planning in choosing
the precise voucher value. This proposed procedure is in contrast to hitherto
observed educational policy practice, which is generally based on the maximum
ﬁnancial framework available (i.e., ﬁnancial volume, not voucher values) rather
than on eﬃciency considerations.
Thirdly, the voucher system raised the adult education participation of indi-
viduals with low educational attainment and those with no active history of
involvement in adult education. The experiment also discloses a deﬁnite pos-
itive correlation between the amount of the deadweight loss and the voucher
recipient’s educational attainment level. In other words, the higher the edu-
cational attainment level, the greater the redemption rate and the higher the
deadweight loss. Hence, the causal eﬀect in terms of raising participation is
highest, relatively speaking, for individuals with low educational attainment.
This means that formal educational attainment would be the best criterion for
excluding a subset from voucher receipt and hence facilitating maximum eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency of the tool.
Naturally, a number of open questions remain after this experiment. We hope
20to resolve some of them in further research. Future evaluations will look at
whether the type and content of adult education funded by the vouchers diﬀer
from the type and content of education paid for without vouchers, and will seek
to identify any short-term eﬀects of adult education activity. The latter will
take place in 2007 with the input of information from the latest survey of the
experimental and control group in 2007.
Other questions cannot be answered by this experiment. These include longer-
term dynamic eﬀects that would come with any real-life launch of a voucher
model. Whereas there is unlikely to be any major increase in the causal eﬀect
produced by vouchers in terms of increasing adult education participation, a
further increase of the deadweight loss is likely. Introduction of a permanent
voucher system would also be expected to impact on employer behavior. Finally
a limited experiment is not suﬃcient to investigate the behavior of adult educa-
tion providers. This would take a long-term experiment as providers would be
unlikely to have the means or will to respond to a short-term change in demand.
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24A Tables
Table 2: Redemption rates





Age > 40 19.45







Upper secondary level 17.08
Tertiary level 26.32
25Table 3: Adult education behavior broken down by experimental and control group
Probit regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Dependent variable: Course participation in 2006
Experimental group Control group
Independent variables Coeﬀ. Standard Coeﬀ. Standard
error error
Voucher 750 0.042 0.034 - -
Voucher 1500 0.050 0.034 - -





















Age 0.011 0.011 0.007
† 0.004
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000
∗ 0.000
City of Basel 0.030 0.062 0.021 0.021
City of Bern 0.038 0.059 0.047
∗ 0.021
Cities of Geneva and Lausanne 0.007 0.057 -0.009 0.016
Urban Ticino 0.064 0.081 -0.065
∗∗ 0.016
City of Zurich 0.078
∗ 0.038 0.014 0.014











Observed probability 0.403 0.338
Estimated probability 0.392 0.314
Pseudo R
2 0.092 0.130
Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies for marital status and for children under age 5.
26Table 4: Causal eﬀect of adult education vouchers in increasing participation
Probit regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Dependent variable: Course participation in 2006
Independent variables Coeﬀ. Standard Coeﬀ. Standard
error error
Voucher 0.055
∗∗ 0.015 - -
Voucher 200 - - 0.027 0.024
Voucher 750 - - 0.064
∗∗ 0.025
Voucher 1500 - - 0.075
∗∗ 0.025



























City of Basel 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.020
City of Bern 0.046
∗ 0.020 0.046
∗ 0.020




City of Zurich 0.022 0.013 0.022 0.013











Observed probability 0.346 0.346
Estimated probability 0.324 0.324
Pseudo R
2 0.125 0.125
Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies for marital status and for children under age 5.
27Table 5: Causal eﬀect of adult education vouchers in increasing participation in the
employed population only
Probit regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Dependent variable: Course participation in 2006
Independent variables Coeﬀ. Standard Coeﬀ. Standard
error error
Voucher 0.053
∗∗ 0.017 - -
Voucher 200 - - 0.016 0.027
Voucher 750 - - 0.048
† 0.028
Voucher 1500 - - 0.093
∗∗ 0.029
























City of Basel 0.030 0.023 0.029 0.023
City of Bern 0.037
† 0.022 0.038
† 0.022






City of Zurich 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.015
Other cities 0.023 0.016 0.023 0.016
Part-time 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.014
Hourly wage (logarithmized) 0.070
∗∗ 0.016 0.069
∗∗ 0.016
Self-employed 0.028 0.019 0.028 0.019
Employee
in managerial position 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.016
with supervisory function 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Tenure -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
Size of ﬁrm 10-49 0.034
∗ 0.016 0.034
∗ 0.016
Size of ﬁrm 50-99 0.006 0.020 0.006 0.020
Size of ﬁrm over 100 0.047
∗∗ 0.017 0.048
∗∗ 0.017
Sideline job 0.031 0.021 0.031 0.021







Observed probability 0.383 0.383
Estimated probability 0.365 0.365
Pseudo R
2 0.127 0.127
Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies for sectors, marital status and for children under age 5.
28Table 6: Adult education participation in 2006 as a function of adult education activity
in 2005; Multinomial logistic regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Reference category: No course participation in 2005 and 2006
Independent variables Coeﬃcient Standard error
Course participation in 2006 only





Course participation in 2005 and 2006
Voucher 200 0.016 0.019
Voucher 750 0.027 0.020
Voucher 1500 0.006 0.019
Course participation in 2005 only
Voucher 200 0.011 0.020
Voucher 750 0.011 0.021
Voucher 1500 -0.020 0.019







Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies as in Table 4.
29Table 7: Estimated deadweight loss by prior educational attainment level
Distribution of redeemed vouchers as a percentage of all vouchers per group
Prior educational Deadweight Causal Deadweight loss
attainment loss in % eﬀect as a % of re-
in % deemed vouchers
Compulsory School 3.7 6.1 37.7
Upper secondary level 8.7 6.6 56.8
Vocational training 9.4 5.0 65.1
Matura 5.5 13.7 28.7
Tertiary level 17.7 5.5 76.3
Non-academic tertiary degree 16.6 7.7 68.3
University 19.6 1.8 91.4
Total 10.0 6.5 60.5
Table 8: Number of courses attended within the past year (in %)
Number of Control Experimental Voucher
courses group group redeemed
1 73.6 73.1 64.7
2 19.3 20.9 23.6
≥ 3 7.1 6.0 11.7
100 100 100
30Table 9: Number of courses attended
Multinomial logistic regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Reference category attended no courses

















Voucher 200 -0.000 0.010
Voucher 750 0.015 0.011
Voucher 1500 0.032
∗ 0.013
Vocational training 0.013 0.008
Matura 0.038
∗∗ 0.014




3 or more courses attended
Voucher 200 -0.004 0.004
Voucher 750 0.000 0.004
















Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies as in Table 4.
31Table 10: Employer funding of adult education
Probit regression: Marginal eﬀects at mean values
Dependent variable: Employer funding of course
Independent variables Coeﬃcient Standard error
Voucher 200 -0.018 0.020
Voucher 750 -0.022 0.019
Voucher 1500 -0.010 0.020
















City of Basel 0.001 0.018
City of Bern 0.014 0.017




City of Zurich -0.013 0.012
Other cities -0.008 0.012
Part-time -0.032
∗∗ 0.011





in managerial position 0.011 0.012





Size of ﬁrm 10-49 0.053
∗∗ 0.014
Size of ﬁrm 50-99 0.059
∗∗ 0.018
Size of ﬁrm over 100 0.090
∗∗ 0.015
Sideline job -0.004 0.017









Levels of signiﬁcance : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Dummies for sectors, marital status and for children under age 5.
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